World Savvy Monitor

China is in a period of intense transition in terms of how it relates to its neighbors, developing countries around the world, fellow powerful nations, regional entities, and the international community as a whole.   Broadly, China’s current foreign policy orientation can be said to have three main catalysts:

• Its rise as an economic power:  The rise of the booming Chinese economy equals far-reaching global influence, and requires that this influence is used, in part, to meet growing resource needs.
• Its historical experience:  The collective memory of China’s “century of humiliation” is embedded in the Chinese psyche.  From the mid 1800s until Mao essentially closed the country to foreigners in 1949, China was at near perpetual war with its neighbors, within itself, and with other imperial powers.  Nationalism and wounded pride from this era exist not far below the surface for many Chinese people.
• The perception that the era of US world domination is waning:  It is clear that other countries are considering whether a major transition in geopolitics is imminent, and what implications such transition would have for them.  China’s position as the likely contender, along with the European Union, to potentially unseat the United States as the world’s hegemonic superpower is fraught with challenges and opportunities for the PRC.

The Peaceful Rise

China’s official stated foreign policy doctrine is that of a “peaceful rise,” a concept that has its roots in Deng Xiaoping’s 24 Character Strategy in the 1990s:  “observe calmly, secure our position; cope with our affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”  In the early years of the 21st Century, the term “peaceful rise” was officially coined by an advisor to President Hu Jintao and summed up by his Premier Wen Jiabao in 2004 when he proclaimed that China’s rise “will not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country.”  President Hu Jintao said himself that the “peaceful rise” is comprised of Three Nos – “no challenge, no exclusion, no confrontation.”  The term has since been semantically tempered, and the policy is now officially called China’s “peaceful development.”  It basically seeks to assure the international community (and the United States in particular) that power dynamics in the China Era will not be a zero-sum game.  See Key Foundation Documents for more elaboration of this policy.

The motivation for this atypical doctrine in international relations is interesting.  Historically, changes in the balance of geopolitical power and the rise of a new power in the world has had a de-stabilizing effect as other countries scramble to balance its disproportionate weight.  The new power has also tended generally towards aggressively asserting power on the global stage, often in a menacing way.  Classic examples of this include the rise of Germany, Japan, and the USSR in the 20th century.  Thus far, however, it cannot be said that China has acted in an aggressive or menacing way, or that a major movement is underway to contain or balance its power.

Most foreign policy experts agree that China has not embarked on this path of aggression as it has accumulated extraordinary strength, due to many factors:

• First, China faces enormous domestic challenges created by its rapid industrialization over the past thirty years.  These challenges include extreme wealth gaps, the need to maintain social stability in the face of these glaring inequalities, environmental degradation, food and water scarcity, and restive ethnic minorities.  China is, technically, still a developing nation, despite the size of its economy, when you consider the distribution of resources across a population of 1.3 billion people.  Since the CCP recognizes that social stability is to some degree contingent on continued economic growth, its focus has been there, and many theorists have speculated that China has neither the time nor the resources for an adventurous foreign policy.
• Second, China has seen its share of war and destruction in the last century.  China has endured dismantlement at the hands of imperial powers, a long-running civil war, and a devastating World War.  Following peace with the outside world in 1949, the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution wreaked further havoc on the population, with massive displacements, starvation, and government-imposed hardship.  Times are relatively much better in China in recent years, at least for the middle classes, and there is great incentive for China to stay focused on that, even as international conflict and intrigue orbit them.
• Third, China's geography does not favor international aggression.  China has the distinction of sharing the most international borders of any country in the world, as well some of the longest ones.  It simply has too many neighbors and too many disputed boundaries for it to engage in demarcation by military intervention.  Since controlling restive boundary regions is already an issue, most speculate that China has neither the capacity nor the desire to pursue territorial expansion.  Over the past 50 years, China has largely negotiated its border issues with its neighbors, often to the PRC’s own territorial disadvantage.  With respect to disputes that remain, chiefly around maritime borders, China is in various stages of negotiation and/or preservation of the status quo.

How China Pursues its Peaceful Rise Doctrine:  Soft versus Hard Power

How China protects and manages its interests and ascent to power has largely been described as the practice of soft power (versus coercive power).  The term soft power was first coined by historian Joseph Nye and refers to cultural and ideological power and influence that derives from “the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”  China’s "peaceful rise" has epitomized soft power, accompanied by a concentrated effort to downplay or obscure flaws and discontent within its system.  Its objectives, as described by researcher Rumi Aoyama and quoted by Joshua Kurlantzick in his book, Charm Offensive, consist of “publicizing China’s assertions to the outside world, forming a desirable image of the state, issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China, improving the international environment surrounding China, and exerting influence on the policy decisions of other countries.”  Most agree that China has been moderately successful in this endeavor, not only among the developing world, but also in developed countries such as Australia:

• A primary avenue of China’s soft power has been its economy.  Although some of China’s economic power may be said to be coercive (driving competitors from the market, the purchase of foreign debt), much of China’s economic soft power is derived simply from other countries (voluntarily) having an interest and stake in its success.  With much of the world interwoven in to its markets and supply chains, China’s prosperity is a recognized factor in the economic prosperity of other nations, a reality which confers on the PRC certain power to influence the actions of stakeholders globally.
• Second, China has also sought to extend its power and influence in the world via a wide range of diplomatic measures.  China’s formal diplomatic corps is not only a group of multilingual, culturally competent, well-informed professionals in the realm of international etiquette, but they are also assigned long-term posts where they both cannily and genuinely build relationships that prove enormously valuable.  This is in contrast to many U.S. postings, in which diplomats are moved every few years.  China’s high-level government officials also engage in considerable face time with colleagues in foreign countries, especially those in what Parag Khanna has called the “Second World,” or developing countries ripe for alignment with a First World power ready to serve their needs. China both hosts and attends numerous summits involving international players.  Finally, China’s Party elite are well-educated and look outward to study and learn from other nation’s successes and follies.  The government supports numerous think tanks and training institutions designed to empirically examine the practices of other cultures and nations and devise trainings and manuals for Chinese diplomats.
• Third, this highly educated and trained diplomatic corps is supported by a general trend in China’s foreign policy circles toward the embrace of multilateral, and especially regional, organizations.  ASEAN+3, SCO, and The Six Party Talks are a few of the formal treaty organizations to which China belongs; these organizations act as observers to regional bodies beyond Asia.  China currently sends more support to United Nations Peacekeeping efforts around the world, including efforts in the Middle East and Africa, than any other permanent member of the Security Council.  China is now a member of the World Trade Organization and numerous other multilateral free trade agreements in Asia.  Through participation in these bodies, China extends its soft power and diminishes its perception as a threat.
• Fourth, China conducts considerable informal diplomacy and wields soft power through cultural exchanges, through student exchanges, and within the diaspora of Chinese nationals and immigrants living abroad.  Through these informal channels, Chinese expatriate communities abroad are organized to support PRC policies and to lobby their host governments and societies for more access by Chinese companies and organizations.  In this way, Chinese expatriates can counter the similar attempts of Taiwanese expatriates who are trying to do the same.  The fact that more schools around the world are teaching Mandarin Chinese to students as young as Kindergarten is partly due to informal diplomacy efforts of the Chinese government.
• Fifth, as Joshua Kurlantzick, John Ikenberry and others have noted, China models an alternative path to development than the one offered by the United States and the West.  The Washington Consensus is a model for development characterized by rapid adoption of free-market mechanisms.  Also known as Structural Adjustment, this policy has consisted of conditional loans to many developing African, Asian, and Latin American countries by the US, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), to often disastrous ends.  By its very example, and without coercive economic measures, China offers an alternative in the form of the Beijing Consensus.  This path advocates state-directed, incremental free market reforms without wholesale societal or political liberalization.  This makes sense to other developing nations who feel the US and IMF have sought to influence their economies without understanding the challenges the leaders of these poorer nations face.  China’s model, just by virtue of its relative success, is extremely influential among other ex-Communist states and authoritarian governments – it is viewed as a "middle" way that seems more in sync with their realities on the ground.

Parag Khanna has remarked that if you were to come up with a metaphor for how the United States and China are “navigating the tricky waters of globalization,” the US symbol would be a military aircraft carrier, and the Chinese symbol would be a merchant ship.  As more countries around the world become disillusioned with what they perceive is the adventurist, cynical, and increasingly ineffective US military means of persuasion, more countries are wooed by and are gravitating toward China’s “peaceful rise.” International opinion polls conducted by the BBC, Pew Global Research, and others have recently ranked perception of China’s role in the world more positively than that of the United States, particularly among China’s neighbors.

Rebuttals to the Peaceful Rise Phenomenon

There are many others who believe China’s popularity to be overstated and the United States’ influence to be unfairly downgraded.  While experts on the American political right and left differ on China's international perception, as do experts around the world, most do agree that China’s strong showing on the international stage is a relatively new phenomenon, and that they are experiencing a “honeymoon” period that will eventually subside.  Most experts predict that China will not enjoy its current position with soft power indefinitely.  The protests surrounding the Olympic Torch show that this is beginning to happen in the developed world and some believe other countries aren’t far behind in re-evaluating admiration for China.

Others believe not only that China’s soft power is bound to wane, but also that it was never very "soft" in the first place.  These critics point to cut-throat capitalism with a state-provided accelerant, and to China’s relations with “rogue nations.”  Since China must aggressively pursue natural resources to keep its economy humming, and the “peaceful rise” doctrine honors a non-intervention policy in dealings with sovereign nations, this often involves China in partnerships viewed critically in the global community.  Recently, this has included regimes widely viewed as some of the worst offenders of international law in the world, from Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Congo to Iran, Burma, and North Korea.

The vast commodities markets in these countries are largely closed to Western competitors because of punitive economic sanctions.  China has used this opportunity to steadily build up lucrative contracts for natural resources needed to power its vast economy.  In the process, considerable assistance is often provided to these unsavory partners that, some believe, protects them from what would otherwise be the demise of their regimes or states.  International outrage over these alliances detracts from China’s soft power among other nations.  There are times when Chinese non-intervention has been viewed as obstructionist when international bodies attempt to address aberrant behavior in these rogue regimes, as happened with proposed United Nations actions against Sudan, Iran, and North Korea.

China has not neglected its capacity to use hard power, though.  From 2000-2005, the PRC has increased its military strength by aggressively overhauling training and technology to create a “smarter,” more responsive army and navy. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest standing army on the planet and is increasingly more tech-savvy, better educated, and better equipped for modern warfare, including cyber-warfare.  Although China’s overall military expenditures increase by double-digit percents each year, they are still dwarfed by the United States.  Yet the PLA is becoming increasingly stronger in the Taiwan Strait, throughout Asia and even beyond.

The Responsible Stakeholder

In 2005, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick formally acknowledged China’s rise (peaceful and otherwise) and issued a groundbreaking missive to the PRC.  Zoellick welcomed China into the international community, and asked it to step up to the attendant responsibilities of its global power and influence.  The term “responsible stakeholder” has now become the corollary to the “peaceful rise,” and implies that China must look beyond self interest to act in ways that are commensurate with its status in the world.  Recently, UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband echoed this sentiment, introducing the term “responsible sovereignty” as it pertains to China’s actions in the world.  An implicit bargain was put on the table:  the US and West will accommodate China’s rise as long as China begins to play by the rules expressed in international laws and norms.  See Key Foundation Documents.

This is an example of another aberration in traditional power dynamics in international relations:  current powers accommodating, rather than attempting to balance, deter, or contain, a rising power.  Whether this strategy will work remains to be seen – will the West honor its stated friendly intentions, and will China truly "play by the rules?"  Aas John Ikenberry points out in his article “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” globalization provides a powerful incentive for everyone involved in this grand bargain, and China really only benefits by coming in under the tent of the international community.  Ikenberry writes, “Today’s Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join.”

Modern China’s foreign policy record to date would indicate that CCP leadership understands this reality.   With the exception of Taiwan, China has peacefully settled most boundary disputes, has not overtly threatened neighbors, has limited use of its significant veto power on the United Nations Security Council (except cases related to Taiwan), has joined international organizations and numerous regional ones, and has generally pursued a multilateral foreign policy.  Despite years of obstructionism on behalf of its partner in oil, Sudan, China is now on-board with the current United Nations/African Union Peacekeeping force in Darfur.  China has a generally good record with respect to United Nations Peacekeeping activities, sending more personnel to missions worldwide than any other permanent Security Council nation.  For the first time in history, a Chinese Major-General will assume command of a UNPK force, in the Western Sahara.

Likewise, Western powers understand that there are enormous benefits to be gained from China’s involvement as a responsible member of the international community. Beyond the economic benefits associated with China’s involvement, some have noted that China’s ties to unsavory regimes could be put to benevolent use.  As anti-Americanism rises in the wake of the Iraq, Afghanistan, and counterterrorism campaigns worldwide, the Chinese may have the ear of leaders in countries who have tired of Western domination.  Some of the countries that have caused considerable angst - North Korea, Iran, Burma, Zimbabwe - enjoy close ties to China, which could be leveraged to address some seemingly intractable geopolitical problems.  As Christopher Hill, the US envoy to the Six Party Talks on North Korea, has said, “China has become the first stop for any American diplomacy.”  In North Korea, Hu Jintao has already balanced George W. Bush’s more aggressive stance with respect to Pyongyang.

If China does in fact continue to step up to be a responsible stakeholder, including productive participation in the UN, the WTO, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), at a minimum, these international institutions could grow to provide solutions to larger problems of the global commons and the establishment of basic standards of living for all the world’s citizens.  Chinese manpower, know-how, and sheer size could re-invigorate these institutions and possibly even lure fence sitters on important issues and treaties.

There are numerous contingencies that could potentially derail this more optimistic view of the new world order.  There are events and trends that could cause China to act aggressively and counterproductively with respect to international relations, provoking containment and balancing initiative by other nations against China’s rise.  This alternative and more dangerous scenario to the “peaceful rise” could realign the world into camps split between China and the West, and work against global problem solving.  See What Next section for details.

Next:  Key External Players:  The United States